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I.

THE JURY'S VERDICT WAS SUPPORTED BY CLEAR, CONVINCING,
SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE!

The plaintiff

and appellant

rebuts

only

facts

which

are

alleged to be relevant to the issues presented by the defendant
and respondent in their brief, to-wit:
CLAIM: a. It is claimed that Black was to pay to
Israel Pagan $1,000.00 at the closing.

FACT:
story.

This statement is true but it only tells part of the

Dorius

Black

did

execute

a

promissory

note

for

One

Thousand Dollars; but he never intended to pay anything; nor did
he

pay

anything,

in

fact,

Bill

Brown

Realty

was

given

the

$1,000.00 down payment after the closing out of the Pagan equity
(TR-564).

The $1,000.00 came from monies received from Capitol

Thrift and was drawn on the account of Stewart Title

(TR-564).

Black personally paid nothing and he denied having any interest
in or taking any title to the Pagan property, and further denied
being liable for the making of any loans or the borrowing of any
money on the Pagan property (TR-499).
CLAIM: b. Based on value of the home and Mr. Cannon's
financial strength, lender agreed to loan $32,325.00 to Cannon
for the purpose of purchasing Pagan's property.
FACT: Again, this claim is partially true. The loan was made
on the value of the home; as far as Joseph Cannon's

financial

strength is concerned, it was always questionable; his testimony
was questionable; and, he certainly became financially "insecure"
shortly after the transaction was completed. (Tr-857) also (See
Exhibit

"1", Exhibit

"7", Exhibit

"37", and

Exhibit

"38D".)

Cannon has no recollection of submitting a credit report prior to
this transaction (TR-575). Cannon denied negotiating with Capitol
Thrift about a loan on the Pagan property (TR-582). Cannon denies
making any applications to Capitol Thrift for a loan on the Pagan
property (TR-582, 583, 584).
Capitol
TR-596).

Thrift
He

the

financial

further

denied

Cannon denies, under oath, giving
statement.
giving
2

Capitol

(See

Exhibit

Thrift

"36",

Borrower's

Statement.

(See Exhibit

"37", TR-596.) Joseph Cannon testified

his only purpose for being at the closing was to be a guarantor
of loans and purchases of Dorius Black
582).

(TR-566, 567, 569-570,

Joseph Cannon never put one cent of his money in the real

estate transaction.

He made no payments on the trust deed and

note and claimed no equity in the Pagan property.

In fact, he

admitted he had never seen the property and that he didn't even
know that the property had been deeded to him (TR-570, 572, 578,
584, 593-594). Cannon testified that he did not receive any money
personally from the transaction (TR-566, 568).
CLAIM:
c. Mr. Cannon went to Capitol Thrift and
extended his loan payments on two separate occasions when the
loan became delinquent (TR-855).
FACT:
making

any payments

financially
(TR-857).
payment

Cannon admitted going to Capitol Thrift but denied
for

"insecure"
The ledger

(TR-645).

the
six

extensions
(6)

card did

months

(TR-856).
after

Cannon

was

the

transaction

not show who made

the alleged

Hanks testified that the records do not show

where the money came from (TR-646). Neither Black nor Cannon made
any payments on the Pagan home (TR-494, 496, 498, 503, 504, 506,
and 523, 852).
CLAIM: d. Capitol Thrift was not involved in any of
the business arrangements between Black, Cannon or Alpha Leasing
(TR-523, 524).
FACT:

Capitol Thrift appraised the home, prepared the note

and mortgage, substituted Cannon for Black as buyer, paid Black
$4,848.75, paid

Cannon

entire transaction.

$13,471.57

and

generally

financed

the

Capitol Thrift supplied the Trust Deed and
3

Note; required that their Trust Deed be recorded first; ordered
$4,848.75 to be paid to Capitol Thrift and the remainder of the
funds to be paid to Joseph L. Cannon or so as he directs, that
Cannon's name be put on all checks so as to prove consideration
in this matter (TR-505, See also Plaintiffs Exhibit " 1 " ) ,
CLAIM: e. Business arrangement to purchase Pagan's
home was between Cannon, Alpha Leasing and Black.
FACT:
appraised
Cannon

Capitol
Pagan's

for

Black,

mortgage, directed
transaction

Thrift

financed

home, paid

Black

prepared

Exhibit

the

entire

finder's

transaction,

fee,

"1", prepared

substituted
note

the order of recording, participated

from beginning

to

end

with

directions

and

in the

on how

to

disburse the funds. Cannon was not told by Capitol Thrift that he
had been substituted as a buyer (TR-849).
CLAIM: f. Loan officer Hanks did not even know who
Mr. Pagan was at that time (TR-860).
FACT:

This is hard to believe when Merlyn Hanks personally

appraised Pagan's home; financed entire transaction; prepared all
documents; insisted that Israel Pagan deed his house and lot to
Joseph Cannon and have the deed recorded first and prior to the
second

trust

deed

from

Cannon

to

Pagan.

(TR-505, 620. See

plaintiff's Exhibit "1".)
CLAIM: g. Evidence clearly showed Capitol Thrift's
involvement was limited to Promissory Note and transaction of
Cannon (TR-860).
FACT:

Capitol Thrift supervised all documents; supplied all

monies by written instructions; set forth the terms of the entire
transaction; gave instructions on disbursal of all funds, to-wit:
4

(a)

$4,848,75 to Capitol Thrift and Loan; (b) fees for recording

and title insurance policy; (c)
Cannon

or

as he

directs,

in

remainder of funds to Joseph N.
the

disbursement

Capitol

Thrift

recommended that Joseph N. Cannon's name be on all checks so as
to prove consideration in this matter.

(See plaintiff's Exhibit

"1", TR-505.) Subituted Cannon for Black as purchaser.
CLAIM: h. The only money owed by Black to Capitol
Thrift at the time of the transaction was $4,848.75.
FACT:

Capitol Thrift knew that Dorius Black was a skilled

land developer and they knew that he was heavily in debt to them
(TR-490, 524, 562, 608, 610).
Thrift

money before

Black testified he owed Capitol

the transaction and after

the transaction

(TR-497). Capitol Thrift knew that Black was not taking title nor
was he making any any loans or borrowing any money; he was there
for the

sole purpose

of assisting

in dividing

Israel

Pagan's

equity. (Tr-496). (Tr-503 )
CLAIM:
(TR-667, 580).
FACT: Vickie
closing

there

was

i. Vickie Phelps participated in the closing
Phelps
no

testified

mention

of

that
a

while

Capitol

she was at the
Thrift

mortgage.

(Tr-750); nor, was there any mention of substituting Cannon for
Black. (Tr-754).
CLAIM: j - Sisk conducted the closing in a slow and
careful manner; Pagan asked numerous questions through his
interpreter when he did not understand the transaction (TR-693).
FACT:

Cannon testified that most of the time, at that time,

was spent preparing documents by someone and when the documents
were prepared, that was a very quick action (TR-580, 581).
5

The

rest of the time was waiting for that to happen

(TR-737-739).

Vickie Phelps (TR-749, 750, 752), Emelio Ortiz, and Jack Thorpe,
all testified that material facts were withheld; that there was a
deviation from the Earnest Money Receipt and that the parties did
not understand the transaction (TR-766, 718-720).
CLAIM: k. Sisk testified he told Pagan that Cannon
was purchasing the property and not Black (TR-671).
FACT: Tommy Sisk, Stewart Title Company specialist, admitted
to Emilio Ortiz "It was a crook from the beginning.

I know that,

but I'm not a lawyer to say anything." (TR-766)
CLAIM: 1. Sisk told Pagan that the first and second
trust deeds would exceed the $44,000.00 sales price and that the
Capitol Trust Deed would be recorded ahead of Pagan's $24,000.00
trust deed and that Pagan was told that if Cannon did not pay his
first mortgage then Pagan would have to pay in order to protect
his second mortgage, and that Pagan nor his real estate agent
Rhodes objected to Pagan's trust deed being recorded second
(TR-713).
FACT: The foregoing conflicts with Real Estate Agent Jack
Rhodes testimony. See (TR-718-720)• to-wit:
Q. Was anything said in that closing about mortgages with
Capitol Thrift and Loan.
A. No sir, not to my recollection.
Q.
Was anything at the closing ever said about a First
Mortgage to Capitol Thrift and Loan in the amount of $32,325.00.
A. No.
Q. I'm going to show you what has been marked Exhibit 19.
Was that ever shown to you at the closing by Mr. Sisk or anyone
else?
A. No.
Q. Did you have any knowledge of any type or nature of a
note, Exhibit 2, that that Trust Deed secured?
A. No. I had no knowledge at all of any amount over and
above the original offer, earnest money, which was a total of
$44,000.00.
These documents were not discussed while I was
present.

6

CLAIM: nw Pagan testified he did not claim cause of
action against Capitol Thrift (TR-467).
FACT: Dr. William Barrett testified that Israel Pagan was in
the low to normal range between 80 and 90.

Pagan was mentally

deficient (TR-541, 743, 744, 745).
CLAIM: n. Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766, provides
that the court may reverse a jury verdict.

the

FACT:

"A party claiming that the evidence does not support

jury's

verdict

carries

a heavy

burden.

The

evidence

is

considered in the light most supportive of the verdict, Berkeley
Bank for Cooperatives v. Meibos, Utah, 607 P.2d 798 (1980), and
we will not substitute our judgment for that of the jury where
the verdict is supported by substantial and competent evidence.
Schwartz v. Tanner, Utah, 576 P.2d 873, 875 (1978)."
CLAIM:
o. Miner says Mr. Black was
Capitol Thrift. Respondent's brief at page 20.
FACT:
employee
Dorius

by

It has never been claimed that Dorius Black was an

of Capitol Thrift.

Black

was a

finder

It has always been
who was

paid

claimed

that

$4,848.75 by Capitol

Thrift who was well acquainted with Dorius Black
498).

employed

(TR-493, 497,

Capitol Thrift knew that Dorius Black did not have a real

estate license and, whose only interests was financial gain at
Pagan's expense (TR-197, 490, 492, 579).
CLAIM: p. Plaintiff's own expert testified that a lay
person would not be able to tell Mr. Pagan was disabled by
looking at him.
FACT:

Israel Pagan had a badly scarred face; an IQ between

80 and 90 (TR-540, 550-551); he had never been to school; he

7

spoke very broken English; he had little or no abstract thinking
ability

(TR-538);

comprehend

or

his

mentality

understand

the

was

real

such

estate

that

he

did

transaction

not

(TR-541,

743, 744, and 745).
CLAIM:
q. Plaintiff's own
real estate agents
testified that they felt Pagan was capable of entering into the
real estate transaction.
FACT:

Plaintiff's real estate agents both testified

there was a substantial

deviation

from original

earnest

that
money

receipt (TR-718-720):
1.

Trust

deed

from Cannon

to Capitol

Thrift

was

concealed.
2.

Note from Cannon to Capitol Thrift was concealed.

3.

$34,000.00 Trust deed at 22% interest to be paid

in six (6) months was concealed.
4.

The placing of $55,000.00 worth of mortgages on

the property was concealed.
5.
deviation

Rhodes

testified

from the agreed

transaction
transaction;

(TR-737-739);
that

it

is

that

the

Capitol

Thrift

was a

Earnest Money Receipt
that
in

Rhodes
his

mortgage

never

opinion

understood the transaction (TR-737-739).
that

there

substantial

and

the final

understood

that

Pagan

the
never

Vickie Phelps testified

between

Cannon

and

Capitol

Thrift was never discussed (TR-752).
CLAIM: r. All deviations to the contract were slowly
and clearly explained to Pagan through his interpreter.

8

FACT:

Cannon testified that: "Most of the time was spent in

the preparation of documents by someone and when the documents
were prepared, that was a very quick action. The rest of the time
was waiting for that to happen."

Q. During this time you were

waiting, was anyone explaining to you what was taking place. A
Not to my recollection.

(See Cannon TR-580, 581. See also Rhodes

TR-721.) Where Rhodes testified, nothing was said about mortgages
with Capitol Thrift and Loan; nothing was said about the mortgage
to Capitol Thrift and Loan in the amount of $32,325.00; nothing
was said about Exhibit "32" (TR-737-739). Rhodes testified that
there was a substantial deviation from the Earnest Money Receipt
to the final papers; that he never understood it, nor did Pagan
(TR-737-739).
II.

THE COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY

Respondent's

complain

Instruction No. 21.

that

the

Court

erred

in

giving

The objectionable parts of this instruction

were offered and submitted to the Court by the respondents; in
their

proposed

instruction

No.

11 and

12, which

are

annexed

hereto and by reference made a part hereof.
(This
Respondent.

instruction

did

not

in

any

way

apply

to

the

A casual glance at the instruction reveals that this

instruction applied only to the defendant, Alpha Leasing, who is
not a party to this appeal.

In fact, the jury in their special

Verdict No. 6, found that Joseph Cannon was not an agent of Alpha
Leasing and in Special Verdict No. 10, exonerated Alpha Leasing.
Therefore, Instruction No. 21 has no application to this appeal.)
9

The legal effect of

Instruction

21; is set

Respondents

requested

Instruction

No. 21

respondents

requested

instruction No. 11

forth verbatum in

(TR-310).

See also,

(TR-310); Respondents

are estopped from objecting to their own proposed instructions.
The Courts attention is also called to respondents requested
Instructions No. 7; 8; 9; 11; 12; 13 (TR-303-311); all of which
were given in substance by the Court.

This Court has repeatedly

held that you cannot request that the Court give an instruction
and

later

complain

when

your

instruction

is

given.

This

is

exactly what respondents are doing in this case. Capitol Thrift's
proposed instruction No. 12 (TR-310) which is annexed hereto as
an exhibit reads as follows:

"You may in your discretion award

such damages, if and only if, you find from a 'preponderance1 of
the

evidence

that

said

defendant's

acts

were

wilful

and

malicious." Also see Capitol Thrift's proposed Instruction No. 11
(TR-309) which was given by the Court which reads as follows:
"before punitive damages may be awarded, you must find the issues
in favor of the plaintiff and against the individual defendants,
and further you must find by a 'preponderance' of the evidence
that the individual defendant's conduct in injuring the plaintiff
was wilful and malicious."

The instructions complained of were

prepared and submitted to the Court by respondents herein.

They

should not be allowed to object when their proposed instructions
were given in substance by the Court.

See, Shupe v. Menlove, 18

Utah 2d 130; Cordner v. dinger's, Inc., 15 Utah 2d 85.

10

With regard to Instruction No. 26, appellant represents to
the Court that Instruction No. 26 is proper in all respects. This
instruction

is

clearly

set

forth

on

page

185, of- the

Jury

Instruction Forms for the State of Utah; and has been given by
the Utah Courts, as a proper
years.

instruction

for the past twenty

See Mecham v. Foley, 120 Utah 416, 235 P.2d 497 and Evans

v. Gaisford, 247 P.2d 431 (Utah).
Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hospital Inc.,

675 P.2d 1179 (Utah

1983) does not apply to the instant case in fact or in law and
has no bearing thereon.

Appellants assert and allege that the

instructions by the Court were proper in all respect. The Court's
attention is called to the fact that in each instance, the Court
in its special
Thrift

and

verdict

Loan;

with

and,

regard

Stewart

to Joseph

Title

Cannon, Capitol

Company

respectfully

requested that the jury make findings with regard to clear and
convincing evidence.

In each instance, the jury found by clear

and convincing evidence that Joseph Cannon, Capitol Thrift and
Stewart

Title

Company

of Utah, did, by

clear

and

convincing

evidence, engage in a civil conspiracy to defraud the plaintiff.
It was only after the special verdict was made and entered
that the Court issued a judgment based on the jury verdict.
III.
The

jury

documents; the

heard

the

CONCLUSION
evidence,

jury was properly

carefully

examined

instructed, and, answered

all
18

questions and made 18 findings in appellant's favor and against

11

the

respondents;

deliberation;

the

their

verdict

findings

was

and

a

their

result
award

of
of

a

two-day

damages

are

correct. The court's judgment based on the jury verdict should be
affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

27th

day of May, 1988.

MARK S. MINE
Attorney for the Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND MAILING
I hereby certify that I hand delivered
correct

copies

of

the

foregoing

Reply

Brief

four (4) true and
of

Appellant

to

Respondents' Attorneys, Kay M. Lewis and Bruce H. Shapiro, JENSEN
& LEWIS, P.C., 320 South 300 East, Suite 1, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111 this

27th

day of May, 1988.

/srOS?^
Attorney for the Appellant
525 Newhouse Building
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Phone 363-1449
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ADDENDUM

JURY INSTRUCTION NO.

//

In addition to the actual damages plaintiff alleges
he has sustained, he also seeks to recover punitive or exemplary
damages against the defendants.

If you find the issues in favor

of the plaintiff and that he is entitled to recover actual
damages, you may also consider whether the plaintiff is entitled
to such punitive damages.
Before punitive damages may be awarded, you must
find the issues in favor of the plaintiff and against the
individual defendants, and further you must find from
Xderanc^) of the evidence that the individual defendants1 conduct
in injuring the Plaintiff was wilfull and malicious*

If you so

find, you may award, if you deem it proper to do so, such sum as
in your judgment would be reasonable and proper as a punishment
to that defendant for such wrongs, and as a wholesome warning to
others not to offend in like manner.

If such punitive damages

are given, you should award them with caution and you should keep
in mind that they are only for the purpose just mentioned and
are not the measure of actual damage.

Such damages must not exce

ths cum of £5 00,000.00 the amount prayed for by the plaintiff.

Capitol Thrift's Proposed
Jury Instruction No. 11
(TR-309)
Given in
Substance.

JURY INSTRUCTION NO.

/ jyU

If you find that plaintiff suffered damage as a proximate result of the conduct of any of the defendants on which
you base a finding of liability, you may then consider whether
you should award punitive or exemplary damages against such
defendant for the sake of example and by way of punishment.
You may in your discretion award such damagesf if, but only
if, you find by alpreponderance)of the evidence that said
defendant's acts were wilful or malicious in the conduct on
which you base your finding of liability.
In arriving at any award of punitive damages, you
are to consider the following:
1.

The reprehensibility of the conduct of the defen-

2.

The amount of punitive damages which will have a

dant.

deterrent effect on the defendant.
3.

That the punitive damages must bear a reasonable

relation to the actual damages.

Capitol Thrift1s Proposed
Jury Instruction No. 12
(TR-310). Given by t h T ~
Court.

JURY INSTRUCTION NO.
If you find that Plaintiff suffered damage as a proximate
result of the conduct of any of the Defendants on which you base a
finding of liability, you may then consider whether you should
award

punitive

damages

against

such

example and by way of punishment.
award such damages, if,

but

only if,

Defendant

for the sake of

You may in your discretion
you

find by

a ( ^ ^ ^ ^

of the evidence that said Defendants' acts were willful or mall^
cious in the conduct on which you base your finding of liability.
In arriving at any award of punitive damages, you are to
consider the following:
1.

The

reprehensibility

of

the

conduct

of

the

Defendants.
2.

The amount of punitive damages which will have a

deterrent effect on the Defendants.
3.

That

the punitive

damages must

relation to the actual damages.

EXHIBIT "C"
Proposed Jury Instruction
by Joseph Cannon (TR-252)

bear a reasonable

Under the law, it does not necessarily follow from a
finding that one member of a partnership is liable for punitive
damages that any or all of other members of the partnership aie
also liable for punitive damages, • The acts or omissions of c>, *
partner will justify an award of punitive damages against
another partner or partners if and only if those acts or
omissions are within the ordinary course and scope of partnership business and the other partner or partners against
punitive damages are awarded authroized, participated in, or
ratified those acts or omissions.
If you find that the acts or omissions of Joseph N. Cannoi
justify an award of punitive damages against him, punitive
damages may be awarded agains the other partnersjof Alpha Leas
ing if, and only if, you find by the preponderance^ojz the
evidence each of the following elements:
!•

That at the time of the events at which this
lawsuit occurred Joseph N. Cannon was acting as a
partner of Alpha Leasing Company;

2.

That the acts of Joseph N. Cannon were within the
ordinary course and scope of Alpha Leasing1s business

3.

That each of the partners against whom punitive
damages are awarded sought, authorized, participated
in, or ratified the acts or omissions of Joseph
N. Cannon.
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If you find that plaintiff suffered damage as a pro.- «
mate result of the conduct of any of the defendants on which
you base a finding of liability, you may then consider whe-cher
you should award punitive or exemplary damages againsz such
defendant for the sake of example and by way of punishmer.-.
You may in your discretion award such damages, if, hue enly
if, you find Joy a prependerance^of the evidence that said
defendant's acts were wilful or malicious in the conduce en
which ycu base your finding of liability*
In arriving at any award of punitive damages, you
are to consider the following:
1.

The reprehensibility of the conduct of the defen-

2*

The amount of punitive damages which will have a

dant*

deterrent effect on the defendant*
3*

That the punitive damages must bear a reasonable

relation to the actual damages.

